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A Short Policy Analysis of 
Copyright Law and DRM in the 
United States 
by Bill Rosenblatt, GiantSteps Media Tech-
nology Strategies, New York, USA 
The United States is the source of a good 
deal of both the content owned by major 
media companies1 and the technology used 
to distribute it securely. Its progress in 
adopting DRM to protect content owners’ 
intellectual property is therefore of interest 
to concerned parties in Europe, even though 
market and legal conditions are different. 
The first part of this article introduces the US 
legal background and assesses recent legal 
developments that apply to digital content 
and attempts to impose DRM technology 
through legislation. In the second part, the 
perspective of the assessment is extended 
to three relevant issues an assessment of 
DRM would have to consider: the function of 
DRM with respect to the copyright system, 
consumer concerns with respect to DRM, 
and the overall economic value of DRM. 
1 Legal Background and Legal 
Developments 
The legal context for DRM is copyright law. 
Some relevant aspects of US copyright law 
have similarities with those of EU countries by 
virtue of their common derivation from the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty of 1996 (WIPO 1996), 
which were enacted in the US and EU via the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA 
1988) and European Union Copyright Direc-
tive (EUCD 2001) respectively. 
However, there is an important difference 
between the two laws, which leads to divergent 
ways of contextualizing DRM within the legal 
framework. Most EU countries have Private 
Copying provisions in their copyright laws, 
which allow consumers to create copies of 
legitimately obtained content for their own use 
or that of family members. Private Copying 
laws can conflict with DRMs that restrict such 
activities. 
1.1 Fair Use and First Sale 
The US has no broadly applicable Private 
Copying concept in its copyright law.2 Instead, 
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it has two relevant concepts: Fair Use (USC 17, 
§107) and First Sale (USC 17, §109). 
Fair Use is similar to Fair Dealing in UK 
copyright law. It is a set of principles that guide 
courts when deciding whether uses of copy-
righted works are defensible against infringe-
ment charges. The principles include such con-
siderations as the purpose and character of the 
use, including whether the use is of commercial 
nature, and the effect of the use on the market 
for the work. 
US case law has established precedents for 
types of uses being considered presumptively 
fair, such as criticism, parody, and academic 
research. However, because Fair Use is based 
on abstract principles (not facts) and decided 
by courts, it is impossible to conceive of a 
DRM scheme that “upholds Fair Use”. This has 
been a source of contention between US advo-
cacy organizations – such as the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, Public Knowledge, and 
DigitalConsumer.org – and the media industry. 
Contention over Fair Use also affects an-
other part of US copyright law, the aforemen-
tioned DMCA. Although the primary purpose 
of DMCA was to bring the US into compliance 
with the WIPO Treaty, it is mainly known as 
shorthand for one of its provisions (USC 17, 
§12.01, also known as “DMCA 1201”), which 
criminalizes distribution of technology for cir-
cumvention (hacking) of DRM schemes – 
which are known as Technical Protection 
Measures (TPMs) in the law.3 
DMCA 1201 forbids circumvention of 
TPMs even if the purpose of the circumvention 
turns out to be one that a court finds to be Fair 
Use. It comes down to a question of whether 
content rights holders or consumers should get 
the benefit of the doubt about content uses. The 
media industry feels that allowing exceptions to 
the anticircumvention law (beyond the current 
narrow and temporary exceptions for things like 
encryption research and accessing content in 
obsolete data formats) undermines DRM by 
making those exceptions subject to court deci-
sions, and therefore, as a practical matter, gives 
the benefit of the doubt to consumers. 
First Sale, on the other hand, says that 
once someone has legitimately obtained a 
copyrighted work, the publisher of that work 
can have no further claim or influence on any 
further distribution of the work. First Sale law 
has thus enabled such services as public librar-
ies, video rental stores, and so on. Media indus-
try interests argue that First Sale does not apply 
to digitally distributed works (as opposed to 
physically distributed digital works, such as 
CDs and DVDs) because they are made avail-
able under license agreements4 and not via 
copyright. Therefore, First Sale currently does 
not apply to content packaged with DRM. 
1.2 Secondary Infringement Liability 
The other primary principle in US copyright 
law that bears on DRM is the theory of secon-
dary infringement liability. If someone in-
fringes copyright and another party is somehow 
involved, the latter party could be legally li-
able; this is called secondary liability. 
Most countries have some form of secon-
dary copyright infringement liability law. US 
case law has established two types of secondary 
liability, known as contributory and vicarious 
infringement. Contributory means knowingly 
aiding and abetting infringement, while vicari-
ous means being able to control infringing ac-
tivities but choosing not to for one’s own gain. 
A key legal principle that governs appli-
cability of secondary liability to technology 
providers in the US is the 1984 Supreme Court 
decision in Sony vs. Universal (Sony 1984), 
known as the Betamax case because it estab-
lished the legality of Sony’s Betamax video-
cassette recorders (which, ironically, lost out to 
the VHS format in the market) over the film 
industry’s objections. With Betamax, the Su-
preme Court established the principle of “sig-
nificant noninfringing uses”, meaning that if a 
technology can be shown to have significant 
uses that do not infringe copyright, the maker 
or distributor of that technology should not be 
liable for infringement. 
Despite Betamax, a federal appeals court 
(one level below the Supreme Court) found that 
both contributory and vicarious liability applied 
to centralized peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing 
networks (i.e., file-sharing services that maintain 
central directories of files available) in its 2001 
decision in A&M Records vs. Napster (Napster 
2001). As a result, developers created file-
sharing network software that did not rely on 
central directories, such as Grokster, Morpheus, 
BearShare, and LimeWire. There was no theory 
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of secondary liability that applied to the devel-
opers of the client software for these networks. 
The foregoing should set the scene for re-
cent developments on the legal front in the US. 
1.3 The Future of Fair Use? 
Regarding Fair Use, there is a growing recog-
nition of a fundamental incompatibility be-
tween Fair Use guidelines (and the fact that 
only a court can decide on them) and techno-
logical means of controlling access to copy-
righted works. 
In his book Free Culture, Lawrence Les-
sig of Stanford University laments that while 
Fair Use is meant to be a narrow “wedge” be-
tween infringement and non-infringement that 
applies to a small set of borderline content use 
cases and helps courts decide on them, it has 
been overburdened with responsibility of de-
termining the legality of many digital content 
use cases because they all happen to involve 
copying (of bits), thereby making them subject 
to copyright law (Lessig 2004). Some of these 
use cases are analogous to content uses in the 
physical world that do not involve copying: for 
example, broadcasting music over a standard 
radio signal does not require copying, while 
streaming it over the Internet does. 
In general, because digital technology can 
be used to implement an almost infinite variety 
of content distribution models instantaneously, 
it becomes counterproductive to rely on Fair 
Use principles – let alone case precedents from 
the physical content world – to judge whether 
each and every case infringes: it would over-
load the court system, make it necessary to hire 
lawyers where ordinarily none would be neces-
sary, and generally superimpose a physical-
world timeline on a digital paradigm. 
Some legal scholars and advocacy groups 
argue that Fair Use should be kept intentionally 
principle-based – i.e., imprecise – because it is 
meant to handle exactly those cases that precise 
laws cannot handle. Yet in an era where tech-
nology underpins more and more content uses, 
this attitude seems increasingly outmoded. 
Someday, someone is going to have to do 
something about Fair Use – either scrap it in 
favour of more a priori decidable criteria (per-
haps along the lines of Private Copying) or 
augment it with such. Without this, it becomes 
very difficult to enable technology to control 
access to technologically distributed content; 
there are too many fallbacks into the traditional 
legal system. (Of course, this is precisely what 
some of those legal scholars and advocacy 
groups intend.) 
With this in mind, the state of California 
enacted a law in 2004 that requires anyone who 
digitally transmits copyrighted works (e.g., 
through e-mail) to more than 10 other people to 
include the identities of the sender and the work 
(California 2004). In other words, California has 
decided that private copying is probably accept-
able for up to 10 “friends,” beyond which it is 
probably not. Unfortunately, this law attracted 
very little attention. But it is the kind of law that 
seems inevitable in the future. 
There is some momentum in Congress to 
amend DMCA 1201 to allow for circumvention 
of Technical Protection Measures to facilitate 
Fair Uses of content. One piece of legislation 
along these lines that has been introduced is the 
Digital Media Consumer Rights Act (DMCRA 
2003), which (among other things) would roll 
back DMCA to allow circumventions for nonin-
fringing purposes. The bill has some chance of 
passage in the near future; its sponsors are bipar-
tisan. The IT and telecoms industries as well as 
many of the aforementioned advocacy groups 
back DMCRA; the media industry opposes it. 
As for First Sale, there is a sense that 
some digitally-distributed content products 
could someday fall under it if a judge decides 
that a particular license agreement has terms 
that are similar enough to copyright usage 
terms that the product should be judged as if it 
were copyright (this is known in America as 
the “If it looks like a duck, waddles like a duck, 
and quacks like a duck, it must be a duck” 
principle), thereby setting a precedent. This has 
not happened yet, however. 
1.4 Grokster and Secondary Liability 
The media industry has tried to get US govern-
ment to do something that would bring decen-
tralized P2P networks like Grokster and Mor-
pheus under the regime of secondary infringe-
ment liability. The first attempt was to lobby 
Congress to pass a law that would make it ille-
gal to “induce infringement of copyright”. This 
was known as the “Induce Act” (Induce 2004). 
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It failed: Senator Orrin Hatch, the bill’s sponsor, 
decided not to take the bill forward when the 
various sides in the debate could not agree on 
reasonable criteria for judging “inducement”. 
Around the same time, a federal appeals 
court dealt the media industry a setback when it 
ruled that secondary liability did not apply to 
the decentralized P2P networks Grokster and 
Morpheus, and that the Betamax principle of 
significant noninfringing uses did. The media 
industry responded to these setbacks by getting 
the Supreme Court to hear the Grokster case. 
In June 2005, with its decision in MGM 
vs. Grokster (Grokster 2005), the Supreme 
Court unanimously did what the lower court 
and Congress would not do: establish an “in-
ducement” principle in copyright law. “In-
ducement to infringe” is, in fact, a well-known 
principle in patent law (USC 35, §271(b)). An 
implementer of technology that infringes a 
patent may not actually infringe itself; it may 
“induce” someone who uses the technology to 
infringe the patent. 
The Supreme Court established a set of 
criteria that determine inducement to infringe 
copyright: the developer of the technology 
must actively market the technology for in-
fringing purposes, and its business model must 
depend on infringement. Those who merely 
invent technology that could possibly be used 
for infringing purposes but do not meet those 
criteria, are not liable. The court did not over-
turn Betamax, but the line between “substantial 
noninfringing uses” and “inducement” has yet 
to be explored in the courts. 
The Supreme Court found that both Grok-
ster and Streamcast (the firm that developed the 
Morpheus software) met the inducement criteria. 
It vacated the lower court’s summary judgment 
in the case, which means not that the two firms 
were found guilty, but that the case is referred 
back to the lower court, which must now hold a 
trial and take the Supreme Court’s decision (i.e., 
the inducement principle) into consideration. 
Soon after the Grokster case, the music 
industry sent cease-and-desist letters to many 
P2P network software developers based in the 
US, and most of them chose to shut themselves 
down quickly. One that did not, LimeWire, is 
implementing a hash-based filtering scheme to 
show that it “respects copyright”, although the 
scheme it intends to use has been shown to be 
easily hackable. Grokster settled the case by 
selling its assets – essentially its list of sub-
scriber information – to a service called 
Mashboxx, while BearShare sold its assets to 
iMesh. Streamcast intends to fight the case, 
which could take years. 
1.5 Mandating DRM 
The media industry has also been lobbying 
Congress to pass legislation that makes DRM 
technology mandatory in digital media render-
ing hardware and software. A previous attempt, 
the so-called Hollings Bill of 2002 (after its 
sponsor, Sen. Ernest Hollings), failed over 
forceful opposition from the IT industry (led by 
Intel) and even some media companies with 
their own interests in IT (Hollings 2002). The 
negotiations over this bill revealed a schism in 
the media industry between companies with 
hard-line attitudes towards DRM, mainly Dis-
ney and News Corp., and those with more lib-
eral attitudes, such as Time Warner. 
The latest attempts to impose DRM-type 
technology on IT and consumer electronics in-
dustries are the Broadcast Flag and the so-called 
Analog Hole bill. A lineup of “usual suspects” 
has formed around these bills as well as past 
ones mentioned above (e.g., the Induce Act): the 
media industry is in favour, while IT, telecoms, 
and consumer advocacy groups are against. 
Broadcast Flag would require digital tele-
vision receivers to detect a simple “flag” (bit of 
data) that would act as a signal that the content 
is not to be copied. This was established in late 
2003, not as a law but as a regulation through 
the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC), the body that regulates radio, television, 
telecoms, and so on. The FCC chose to adopt 
the regulation (FCC 2003), but a federal ap-
peals court found that it was overstepping its 
authority in doing so (USCA 2005). 
Now Congress is considering legislation 
that would explicitly empower the FCC to 
adopt Broadcast Flag. This legislation is con-
sidered unlikely to pass this year, mainly be-
cause it is a small provision tacked onto a ma-
jor telecommunications reform bill in which 
much larger-scale differences have yet to be 
reconciled between the two houses of Con-
gress. But it could be reintroduced next year, 
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along with related legislation that would extend 
the Broadcast Flag concept to satellite radio. 
The so-called Analog Hole bill (Analog 
Hole 2005; formally known as the Digital Tran-
sition Content Security Act of 2005) is meant to 
address illegal analogue copying of video con-
tent, such as through analogue outputs of video 
players. The bill would require certain types of 
video playback equipment to include digital 
video watermarking technology – specifically 
that of a startup company called VEIL Interac-
tive – that can forensically catch pirated content 
once it has been distributed, even if it was con-
verted to high-quality analogue. 
The Analog Hole bill is problematic be-
cause it effectively enshrines a specific tech-
nology firm’s products into law, even though 
the technology has established competition and 
has not even really been used in the situations 
that the bill covers. Additionally, the bill pur-
ports to solve a problem that is shorter-term 
and narrower than that envisioned in the Holl-
ings Bill. For these and other reasons, the Ana-
log Hole bill is also deemed unlikely to pass. 
2 Assessing the Impact of DRM – Three 
Research Topics 
DRM is roughly the same age as related tech-
nologies that have become well-established in 
the market; it dates back roughly to the mid-
1990s. But its success has been relatively lim-
ited, especially when compared to technologies 
for unfettered distribution of unprotected con-
tent, such as MP3 audio files. Therefore it is 
difficult to assess the impact of DRM from 
social, economic, political, or environmental 
perspectives. 
Here we propose three main sets of criteria 
that a proper assessment of DRM might meas-
ure. These are: the functionality of DRM with 
respect to the copyright system, consumer is-
sues beyond copyright, and the economic value 
of DRM. 
2.1 Assessing the Functionality of DRM 
with Respect to the Copyright System 
Copyright systems are intended to preserve a 
balance of interests between content creators 
and the public, so that the public domain is 
enriched while creators have sufficient incen-
tive to keep on creating. Developments in law 
as well as technology constantly threaten this 
balance, so it is hard to evaluate the effect of 
DRM in a vacuum, particularly since DRM 
currently applies to only a narrow slice of con-
tent distribution. 
The most straightforward way of assess-
ing DRM’s effect on the copyright balance is 
to look at DRM systems and compare the 
rights they confer on users to those that one 
would expect to get in a typical copyright 
system. However, there are three limitations 
to this approach. 
First, most DRM systems are not fixed 
with respect to the rights they confer; they can 
be configured by the content owner or distribu-
tor (a notable exception to this, admittedly, is 
Apple’s FairPlay DRM for iTunes). Therefore, 
the rights that a given DRM confers on the 
public are primarily a function of market forces 
(iTunes is very popular and the subject of rela-
tively few complaints about its DRM). 
Second, DRMs are used in content licens-
ing arrangements, which by definition are not 
sales of copyright (see the section on copyright 
law above). They can involve grants of rights 
that aren’t typically considered in copyright 
systems (e.g., limited duration access, such as 
by number of plays or calendar time), which 
makes comparing them to the “copyright bun-
dle” a bit like apples and oranges. 
Finally, copyright systems vary from one 
country to another. As mentioned earlier in this 
article, there are differences between US/UK 
and EU copyright laws that acutely affect how 
DRMs might measure up to them. 
Another way to look at how DRM affects 
the copyright balance is through incentives to 
content creators. It can be said that media com-
panies use DRM to preserve their role in the 
content value chain. The media industry argues 
that this is synonymous with preserving incen-
tives for content creators, though that is a mat-
ter for debate. Yet it is certain that if DRM did 
not exist, and content could be freely distrib-
uted without compensation, the structure of the 
content industry would change dramatically. 
In particular, the industry’s “scalability” 
would suffer beyond recovery. The media in-
dustry is currently structured around the con-
cept of blockbuster films, songs, books, etc., 
which garner direct revenue that is directly 
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proportional to the number of copies sold. 
Without DRM, this component of media indus-
try revenue would collapse. Distribution of 
content without the direct stream of revenue 
would become a means to an end rather than an 
end itself – a way for artists to get exposure so 
that they could make money on other things, 
such as performances and ancillary physical 
merchandise. 
One way of using this observation to derive 
an assessment of DRM’s impact on incentives is 
to look at small content producers, such as inde-
pendent record labels. Most “indies” eschew 
DRM (e.g., they do not release copy-protected 
CDs, and they distribute unencrypted MP3s on 
sites like eMusic.com); they seek to maximize 
exposure for their artists. Indie artists get a 
smaller proportion of their revenue from direct 
content sales than big-name artists do. Would an 
“indie” artist who became famous suddenly 
embrace DRM? If so, at what point in the art-
ist’s popularity (e.g., after how many album 
sales)? Once the artist uses DRM, how much 
benefit redounds to the artist, as opposed to the 
record company? Following some artists over 
time and comparing the outcomes might provide 
some insight into how DRM preserves the bal-
ance of incentives in the copyright system. 
2.2 Assessing DRM from the Consumer 
Perspective 
Organizations such as the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation and UFC-Que Choisir (in France) 
have begun to assess DRMs from the con-
sumer’s perspective. Beyond issues of content 
rights that DRMs convey to users, these or-
ganizations have started to assess them with 
respect to users’ privacy and security, which 
one might call environmental factors. 
Many of the concerns that have been raised 
about DRM privacy and security relate to the PC 
platform, which was definitely not designed 
with DRM in mind. The recent furore over CD 
copy protection technology implemented by 
SonyBMG Music is a good example (Rosenblatt 
2005). The technology, developed by the British 
firm First4Internet, transmitted information 
related to consumers’ usage of content over the 
Internet, and it installed itself in a way that acted 
as a haven for viruses. CD copy protection in 
general is essentially a clumsy retrofit to the PC 
platform; there are bound to be incompatibili-
ties. DRM technologies that are incorporated 
into the designs of other devices (e.g., mobile 
phones) may not corrupt those devices’ security, 
although they may still raise privacy concerns. 
From the content owner’s point of view, 
DRM technology is superior if it provides ac-
curate information about content usage, in or-
der to properly compensate rights holders, and 
if it is impossible to install, so that it cannot be 
circumvented. Those goals can be at odds with 
those of the consumer. 
It should be possible for a consumer 
watchdog organization to develop criteria for 
testing security and privacy of DRMs, just as 
they could for other e-commerce technologies. 
A model for this may be the TRUSTe privacy 
certification for e-commerce websites, which 
signifies respect for users’ privacy. 
2.3 Assessing the Overall Economic 
Value of DRM 
The final assessment criterion that we mention 
here is probably the most elusive one to meas-
ure: the overall economic value of DRM 
(Rosenblatt 2003). Perhaps the main reason why 
DRM has been slow to take off in the market is 
because no one wants to pay for it. In particular, 
the media industry – which, as implied above, 
has the most incentive for DRM – has been un-
willing to pay for DRM technology.5 
The media industry claims losses from 
media piracy in the billions of dollars each 
year. In 2005, the US motion picture industry 
claims USD 2.3 Billion in losses due to Inter-
net piracy (out of USD 6.1 Billion, which also 
includes unauthorized reproduction of physical 
goods, such as VHS tapes and DVDs) (MPAA 
2005). The music industry tracks physical but 
not Internet piracy (IFPI 2005). No media in-
dustry segment has attempted to determine how 
much file-sharing contributes to incremental 
sales through viral marketing, nor have they 
attempted to determine how much DRM-
enabled services enhance revenue by imple-
menting new business models for content (e.g., 
music subscription services). 
Decent estimates of the above would go a 
long way towards establishing the economic 
value of DRM. The next step would then be to 
calculate the effect that certain DRMs have on 
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those figures; this would provide an upper 
bound on the economic value of DRM. To put 
this in some perspective: let’s say that a DRM 
technology could cut the USD 2.3 Billion by 
25 percent and add half a billion dollars in 
revenue from new business models – both rea-
sonable numbers. That puts the maximum 
value of DRM at over a billion dollars, which 
buys quite a lot of DRM. 
A few studies have been done that provide 
some data points (Jupiter 2003, INDICARE 
2005, Fetscherin 2005), but much more work 
could be done. The benefit of such analysis 
would be better cooperation from consumer 
electronics vendors and more of a rifle-shot 
approach to DRM design that focuses on where 
it is most effective for content owners and con-
sumers alike. 
Notes 
1) Even if those media companies are headquartered 
outside of the US, such as Bertelsmann and Sony. 
2) The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (USC 
17, §1001-10) includes some limited private 
copying rights for audio material. 
3) The anticircumvention provision is also derived 
from the WIPO Treaties, and there are now anti-
circumvention laws in most EU countries as well. 
4) End User License Agreements, so called EU-
LAs, or “clickwrap” agreements. 
5) This is not entirely the fault of media compa-
nies: much DRM technology, especially in the 
early days, suffered from the twin problems of 
poor ease of use and being produced by venture-
backed startup companies with unrealistic reve-
nue expectations. 
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Privacy4DRM: Nutzer- und 
datenschutzfreundliches 
Digital Rights Management 
von Jan Möller, Unabhängiges Landeszent-
rum für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein, 
und Stefan Puchta, Fraunhofer-Institut für 
Digitale Medientechnologie 
Ziel dieses Artikels ist es, einen Überblick 
über Inhalt und Ergebnisse der Studie „Pri-
vacy4DRM“ zu geben, die vom Bundesmi-
nisterium für Bildung und Forschung 
(BMBF) gefördert wurde. Dabei werden zu-
nächst Eigenschaften und Einsatzumfeld 
von klassischen Systemen des Digital 
Rights Managements (DRM) näher beleuch-
tet; anschließend wird die datenschutz-
rechtlich geprägte Untersuchungsmethode 
erläutert, gefolgt von der Darstellung der 
konkreten rechtlichen Anforderungen an 
DRM-Systeme. Abschließend werden Hand-
lungsempfehlungen und Forschungsbedarf 
in diesem Zusammenhang vorgestellt. 
1 Einleitung 
Virtuelle Güter in digitaler Form (kurz: digitale 
Inhalte) spielen eine zentrale Rolle in der Infor-
mationsgesellschaft. Dabei kommt dem Schutz 
und dem Management der Urheber- und Ver-
wertungsrechte einerseits und der Wahrung von 
Kunden- und Nutzerrechten andererseits eine 
wichtige Bedeutung zu. Die seit einiger Zeit 
geführten Debatten zielen dabei besonders auf 
den Sinn und die Einsatzmöglichkeiten so ge-
nannter digitaler Rechtemanagement-Systeme 
(DRM-Systeme) ab. Dabei zeigt sich, dass die 
Verwendung von DRM-Technik in aktuellen 
eCommerce-Anwendungen nicht nur technische 
sondern auch vielfältige rechtliche Probleme 
aufwirft – insbesondere, wenn es um den Schutz 
der Privatsphäre des einzelnen Nutzers geht. 
Eine datenschutzkonforme, das informationelle 
Selbstbestimmungsrecht des Kunden respektie-
rende Gestaltung von DRM-Systemen ist aber 
nicht nur unter Compliance-Gesichtspunkten1 
geboten, sondern ist für das einsetzende Unter-
nehmen auch eine Frage der Beziehung zum und 
des Umgangs mit dem Kunden. 
In der Studie „Privacy4DRM“, die das 
Fraunhofer Institut für digitale Medientechnolo-
gie (IDMT) Ilmenau zusammen mit dem Unab-
